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I study the effects of service offshoring on white-collar employment, using highly 
disaggregated occupational data for the U.S.. I present a structural model of the firm’s 
behavior that allows tractable derivation of labor demand elasticities for highly detailed 
occupations. I estimate the model using Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, to simultaneously 
account for the high degree of censoring of the employment variable and the small cross-
sectional dimension of the panel. I find that service offshoring is skill-biased, because it raises 
employment among high-skilled occupations and lowers employment among medium- and 
low-skilled ones. Within each skill group, service offshoring penalizes tradeable occupations 
and tends to benefit complex non tradeable jobs. 
JEL Code: F16, J23, C34. 
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The usual disclaimer applies. 1. Introduction
In this paper, I empirically study the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on U.S. white-collar employment1.
I address two research questions: 1) What are the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring across occupations of
di⁄erent skill levels? 2) How do occupations with tradeable and non tradeable features respond to
service o⁄shoring?
Service o⁄shoring has become a phenomenon in recent years. Thanks to improvements in infor-
mation and communication technologies, trade in services has soared and ￿rms have discovered new
opportunities to globalize their operations (Freund and Weinhold, 2002)2. In the past, o⁄shoring
entailed foreign relocation of intermediate stages of production and gave rise to trade in inputs and
components (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, 2003)3. Nowadays, it also entails relocation of service
activities - like accounting, bookkeeping, customer service operations, computer programming - and
gives rise to the exchange of bits of information across a¢ liated and una¢ liated ￿rms located in di⁄er-
ent countries. The increase in service o⁄shoring has been so rapid and widespread that some authors
have started referring to it as "The Third Industrial Revolution" (Blinder, 2006).
The rise in service o⁄shoring has attracted much attention in the media and has become an
important topic of discussion in political talks (Amiti and Wei, 2005a; Mankiw and Swagel, 2006).
One of the most debated issues has been the e⁄ects on the white-collars. Being employed in service
activities, these workers are likely to bear the bulk of the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring. Moreover, they
show two notable features. First, they usually perform "good jobs", that is jobs paying high wages
and requiring high levels of education and skills. Second, they have generally been shielded from the
previous wave of (material) o⁄shoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, 2003)4. For these reasons,
understanding the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on white-collar employment has become a major goal
for international trade economists.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is one of the ￿rst attempts at analyzing these e⁄ects
empirically. Service o⁄shoring entails relocation of extremely detailed activities, each of which is per-
formed by a speci￿c occupation. In order to take this issue into account, I use detailed information on
employment and wages at the occupation-level, coming from the Occupational Employment Statistics
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I disaggregate employment into 112 occupations, of which 58 are
white-collar. I construct a panel covering the period 1997-2002 and consisting of 144 industries, of
which 9 belong to the service sector; these industries employ the vast majority of U.S. white-collar
employment. Following Amiti and Wei (2005a,b; 2006), I proxy service o⁄shoring with the share of
imported services in total non-energy inputs purchases. I use a¢ liated and una¢ liated import data
on 14 categories of private services, which are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
With these data, I study the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring along two dimensions. First, I look at
broad aggregates of occupations with di⁄erent levels of education. Second, I look at the responses
1With the term "white-collars", I will refer to workers employed in service activities, both in the manifacturing and
in the service sector.
2More than a quarter of today￿ s world trade consists of exchanges of services, and this ￿gure is much higher (almost
40%) in countries like the U.S. (Lipsey, 2006).
3See Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) for studies
assessing the quantitative importance of trade in intermediate inputs and components. In the rest of the paper, I will
refer to this type of o⁄shoring as material o⁄shoring.
4See Olsen (2006) and Crin￿ (2007) for updated surveys on material o⁄shoring.
2of speci￿c occupations within each of these skill groups. The ￿rst dimension of analysis is meant to
pin down potential skill-biased e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring. In order to classify occupations in skill
categories, I merge the OES data with the 2004 5% Public Use Microdata Sample, and exploit the
information on the level of schooling available therein. The second dimension of analysis is meant to
assess the existence of di⁄erences in the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring across occupations with similar
levels of education, and analyze one possible explanation for such di⁄erences. I speci￿cally investigate
the role of tradeable features: some occupations can be more easily traded than others and therefore
be more exposed to service o⁄shoring, independent of their skill level5. Exploiting the de￿nition of
the main activities of the occupations, I classify tradeable occupations as those that perform routine
tasks, require low degrees of face-to-face contact and provide services whose output can be conveniently
transmitted from remote destinations6.
The high level of occupational detail poses two empirical issues. The ￿rst issue is how to model
the relationship among occupations in the ￿rms￿technology. There is a trade o⁄ between avoiding
excessively restrictive assumptions and keeping derivation of functional forms (demand equations)
tractable. The second issue pertains to the estimation of these functional forms. The high level of
occupational detail implies high degrees of censoring (zero observations) in the employment variables
and requires the use of a consistent estimation strategy.
I deal with the ￿rst issue by developing a structural model of the ￿rm￿ s behavior that uses mild
restrictions on the structure of substitutability / complementarity among occupations and allows
tractable derivation of labor demand elasticities for each of them. The model assumes that the
technology of the ￿rms satis￿es homothetic weak separability in groups of homogeneous occupations.
This assumption has been widely used in consumption theory to derive demand elasticities for highly
disaggregated goods, but has been rarely applied in the international trade literature. Due to data
availability, previous studies on o⁄shoring and labor demand have taken a more parsimonious approach,
in which ￿ exible cost functions are used to derive demand equations for small numbers of labor inputs7.
My model integrates homothetic weak separability in that framework and generalizes it to a potentially
high number of labor types.
In estimating the demand functions derived from the model, I deal with the censoring issue by
modifying the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimator developed by Meyerhoefer et al. (2005). This
estimator is designed to provide consistent estimates of the parameters in the presence of censoring
and panel data. The modi￿cation I propose makes the estimator appealing for applications to panel
data of small cross-sectional dimension, which are typical of studies using industry-level data.
To preview the results, I ￿nd that service o⁄shoring exerts skill-biased e⁄ects on white-collar
employment, because it raises the overall number of high-skilled jobs and lowers that of medium-
and low-skilled ones. Within each skill group, however, tradeable and non tradable occupations
respond very di⁄erently to service o⁄shoring. Tradable occupations are always negatively a⁄ected by
service o⁄shoring; by contrast, complex and highly specialized non tradeable jobs (lawyers, scientists,
managers, etc.) tend to bene￿t from it.
5See Autor et al. (2003) and Levi and Murname (2004) for a similar argument applied to the e⁄ects of computers
and new technologies.
6Similar de￿nitions have been proposed by Bardhan and Kroll (2005) and Blinder (2006, 2007).
7See, among others, Berman et al. (1994), Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999, 2003), Morrison and Siegel (2001),
Hijzen et al. (2005), Ekholm and Hakkala (2005).
3These results have three main implications. First, they seem at odds with the widespread concern
that service o⁄shoring will lower incentives to invest in education and eventually slow down the
process of human capital accumulation in developed countries8. Although the white-collars represent
the most skilled fraction of the workforce, the negative employment e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring are
concentrated on occupations with low levels of education, whereas high-skilled occupations bene￿t.
Second, the paper suggests that service o⁄shoring may progressively shift the educational demand
towards programs that prepare workers to perform highly complex non tradeable jobs; in this sense,
my ￿ndings are in line with the argument in Blinder (2006). Finally, the paper suggests that standard
trade theories should combine the usual distinction of labor into skilled and unskilled workers with a
parallel distinction that emphasizes the tradeable / non tradeable nature of speci￿c occupations.
This paper contributes to a still very limited empirical literature on service o⁄shoring. Amiti and
Wei (2005a,b) have found only small negative e⁄ects on total employment in the U.K. and the U.S..
This paper suggests that one reason is the high heterogeneity in the response of speci￿c occupations:
since service o⁄shoring bene￿ts some occupations and penalizes others, the aggregate e⁄ects may end
up being small. Other studies have used the same database and similar de￿nitions of tradeable features
as the one in this paper to estimate the number of workers employed in tradeable occupations. These
workers account for 20-25% of the U.S. labor force9. This is an upper bound to the number of jobs
that service o⁄shoring can potentially destroy. In this paper, I look more closely at the causal e⁄ects of
service o⁄shoring, by estimating the actual responses of each tradeable occupation. The econometric
approach also allows me to study the e⁄ects on the non tradeable occupations, which have generally
been neglected in previous studies10.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the data and some prelim-
inary evidence; section 3 describes the theoretical model; section 4 explains the estimation strategy;
section 5 presents and discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
2. Data, stylized facts and preliminary evidence
In this section, I describe the database and provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between
service o⁄shoring and white-collar employment11. Due to data availability, my panel covers the period
1997-2002 and consists of 144 industries, of which 135 are in the manufacturing sector and 9 in the
service sector. Table 1 reports the list of service industries, while the list of manufacturing industries
is reported in the Appendix (Table A4).
8See Tre￿ er (2005a,b), Blinder (2006) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006) for a deep discussion of this concern.
9Bardhan and Kroll (2003), Garner (2004), Jensen and Kletzer (2005), Kroll (2005), Van Welsum and Vickery (2005),
Blinder (2006, 2007), Kletzer (2007).
10The theoretical literature on service o⁄shoring is richer. Some contributions have analyzed the e⁄ects on aggregate
welfare and income distribution. With the only exception of Samuelson (2004), these studies tend to conclude that service
o⁄shoring is likely to raise welfare in developed countries, mainly by inducing a boost in the productivity of domestic
inputs (Bhagwati et al., 2004; Deardor⁄, 2005; Markusen, 2005; Antras et al., 2006a,b; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2006; Markusen and Strand, 2007). As to the income distribution, prediction are more ambiguous. As explained more
in depth in section 5, these studies give di⁄erent weight to the skill intensity and to the tredeable features of di⁄erent
occupations (tasks). In general, however, they suggest that developed countries should specialize in high skill-intensive
activities, or in complex and non routine tasks; as a result, service o⁄shoring should favor the factors used intensively in
these activities.
11Further details on these variables and on the other regressors used in the econometric analysis can be found in the
Appendix.




Real Estate, Rental and Leasing
Legal Services
Computer Systems Design and Related Services
Management of Companies and Enterprises
Professional, Scienti￿c, and Technical Services
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries
2.1. Service o⁄shoring
I follow Amiti and Wei (2005a,b; 2006) and proxy service o⁄shoring with the share of imported services
in total non-energy inputs purchases (SOSS). The underlying idea is that o⁄shoring entails foreign
relocation of service activities, whose output has to be imported back to the U.S., where it will enter
the production process together with other intermediate inputs. The more intense the use of o⁄shoring,
the higher the share of total inputs accounted for by imported services.
Industry-level data on service imports are not available for the U.S.. Therefore, I have to estimate
them for the 144 industries in my sample. I accomplish this task by attributing to each industry a
share in the economy-wide level of service imports. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides
time-series data on a¢ liated and una¢ liated imports for 14 categories of private services, which are
listed in Table 212.
Table 2 - Categories of Private Services Used to Compute the Proxy for Service O⁄shoring
Financial Services Management, Consulting and Public Relation Services
Insurance Services Industrial Engineering
Computer and Information Services Installation, Maintenance and Repair of Equipment
Research, Development and Testing Services Legal Services
Business, Professional and Technical Services Operational Leasing
Advertising Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping
Telecommunication Other Business, Professional and Technical Services
Note: A¢ liated and una¢ liated data on payments to foreign residents for these services are available from
BEA (￿U.S. International Services: Table 1 - Trade in Private Services, 1992-2004")
I use the 1997 BEA Import Matrix to estimate the share of each industry in the 1997 economy-wide
level of imports of each of these services. For a generic industry j (j = 1;:::;J = 144) and service
12These data represent payments by U.S. residents to foreign residents. The bulk of the exchange in these services
occurs between U.S. ￿rms and other ￿rms located abroad (Bhagwati et al., 2004). Hence, payments to foreign residents
provide a good proxy for imports. I am intentionally neglecting a second important form of service o⁄shoring: the hiring
of foreign workers who physically move to the U.S. to provide their services. This type of o⁄shoring is common to those
services that require the physical presence of the supplier in the foreign country (e.g. construction, transportation, etc.).
Unfortunately, lack of data on the in￿ ows of foreign workers hired by U.S. ￿rms prevents me from investigating this issue.
I will therefore take the common approach in the literature (Amiti and Wei, 2005a,b; 2006) and analyze only those cases
in which service o⁄shoring occurs between ￿rms located in di⁄erent countries and gives rises to trade in services.
5category h (h = 1;:::;H = 14), denote this share by #97
jh. I maintain the assumption that #97
jh stayed
constant between 1997 and 2002. Under this assumption, I apply #97
jh to the time-series of imports
of service h (Mht); this gives me a time-varying estimate of the level of imports of that service in
industry j. I then sum these estimates across all services and normalize the resulting quantity by the







Between 1997 and 2002, service o⁄shoring has sharply increased in the U.S.. On average, SOSS
was equal to 2.5% in 1997; by the end of 2002, this ￿gure increased to 5.4%, for an overall rise of
116% (Figure 1). Interestingly, service o⁄shoring has been always higher - and has risen faster - in the
manufacturing sector: in 1997, SOSS was equal to 2.6% in manufacturing and to 2.3% in the service
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Share of imported services on total non energy inputs purchases
Figure 1 - Service O⁄shoring (%)
2.2. Occupational employment
The Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) contain
detailed information on employment and wages at the occupation-industry level for the period 1997-
2005. An industry-year panel can however be constructed only for the shorter time horizon between
1997 and 2002, because data from 2003 on are available on a six-month basis and thus not fully
comparable with those for earlier years.
Only for 9 service industries can the OES data be matched with information on other relevant
variables like output, capital stock, consumption of intermediate inputs and service o⁄shoring. Within
the service sector, however, these industries face the most signi￿cant e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring;
workers in the remaining private service industries, in fact, generally provide non-tradeable services
(think of sectors like transportation, education, art and entertainment), whereas the public sector is
likely to be shielded from o⁄shoring for political reasons (Blinder, 2006).
I disaggregate employment into 112 minor occupations, that can be attributed to 13 major groups
of workers performing homogeneous tasks. Out of the 13 major groups, 8 are white-collar, for a total
of 58 minor occupations. As Table 3 shows, employment in the 8 white-collar groups represents a
6large fraction of the national total: with the only exception of "Life, Physical and Social Sciences
Occupations", my data account for 55-86% of the 2002 level of national employment13.
Table 3 - Share of National Employment Accounted for by the Sample
Major Occupational Group %, 2002
White-Collars
Management Occupations 55.8
Business and Financial Operations 54.6
Computer and Mathematical Occupations 59.3
Architecture and Engineering Occupations 76.8
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations 14.9
Legal Occupations 75.8
Sales and Related Occupations 85.8
O¢ ce and Administrative Support Occupations 54.8
Blue-Collars
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations 14.4
Construction and Extraction Occupations 42.7
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations 33.8
Production Occupations 82.3
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 46.9
Note: Author￿ s calculations based on BLS (Occupational Employment Statistics)
The OES data do not contain any measures of education at the level of the minor occupations. I
therefore use individual-level data from the 5% 2004 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) to estimate
the average level of schooling required to perform each occupation. PUMS classi￿es individuals into
16 di⁄erent schooling categories, ranging from 0 (no schooling) to 16 (Ph.D.). My proxy is obtained
by averaging out the individual-level ￿gures over all workers aged 15 to 65 and sharing the same
occupation. I then de￿ne high-skilled white-collar occupations as those whose average worker has at
least a bachelor￿ s degree, medium-skilled white-collar occupations as those whose average worker has
an associate degree in college and low-skilled white-collar occupations as those whose average worker
has lower levels of educations.
Following previous studies, I identify as tradeable those occupations that show the following fea-
tures jointly: 1) involvement in routine tasks that are repeated almost mechanically; 2) provision of
impersonal services that do not require face-to-face contact; 3) production of services that can be eas-
ily transmitted from remote destinations with low degradation of quality. To this purpose, I use the
description of the main activity performed by each of the 58 white-collar occupations14. The resulting
classi￿cation may be arbitrary, but is only meant to distinguish the set of occupations that are in
principle most at risk of service o⁄shoring; the actual e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring will be revealed by
the econometric analysis.
13Among the blue-collar groups, production workers account for the highest share of national employment (82.3%).
The lowest share (14.4%) is found for the group "Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations": these
workers are highly concentrated in industries excluded from the sample, like hotels and restaurant. For the remaining
groups, the sample accounts for 33-47% of national employment.
14Available from BLS at http://www.bls.gov/soc/socguide.htm.
7Table 4 - Employment Change and Skill Level by Minor Occupation 
Occupation School  Change  1997-2002    Occupation School  Change  1997-2002 
    % #        % # 
High Skilled    1.73 41,852  Budget  Analysts  12  -13.8  -3,016 
Lawyers 15  16.0  52,633    Compliance Officers  12  194.1  21,059 
Life Scientists  14  -18.8  -8,340    Advertising Sales Agents  12  30.9  11,748 
Physical Scientists  14  -13.9  -11,834    Human Resources, Train. and Lab. Rel. Spec.  12  23.0  32,911 
Engineering Managers  13  -36.1  -85,622    Computer Support Specialists  12 -10.0 -29,828 
Advertising, MKTG, Prom., Pub. Rel. and Sales Manag. 13  42.7  133,241    Low Skilled     -2.16  -389,828 
Petroleum Engineers  13  -29.0  -577    Construction Managers  11  -22.1  -5,185 
Computer Hardware Engineers  13  -78.6  -179,054    Industrial Production Managers  11  -22.1  -45,066 
Management Analysts  13  331.3  180,403    Transportation, Storage, and Distribution Managers  11  52.5  15,357 
Aerospace Engineers  13  61.3  21,110    Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing 11  15.3  200,892 
Market and Survey Researchers  13 -53.0 -16,173   Cost Estimators  11 6.3  3,710 
Sales Engineers  13  -10.9  -7,779    Buyers and Purchasing Agents  11  9.6  24,519 
Mechanical Engineers  13  -7.2  -13,106    Property, Real Estate, and Community Association Managers  11  -6.3  -8,649 
Civil Engineers  13  19.7  18,311    First-line Superv. of Off. and Admin. Supp. Work.  11  -17.2  -145,094 
Accountants and Auditors  13 -3.7  -21,943   Engineering  Technicians, Except Drafters  11  -40.8  -208,769 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians  13  -15.1  -19,418   Drafters  11 -18.1 -36,720 
Medium Skilled    -23.96 -1,067,024    Statistical Assistants  11 -35.1 -5,297 
Chief Executives  12  -36.5  -778,571    Demonstrators and Product Promoters  11  -12.2  -8,808 
Medical and Health Services Managers  12  227.4  10,803    Financial Clerks  10 6.0  82,507 
Financial Managers  12  -13.2  -56,426    Parts Salespersons  10  -19.5  -54,734 
Human Resources Managers  12  -15.2  -18,724    Information and Record Clerks  10 -48.2 -162,233 
Purchasing Managers  12  -48.0  -71,445    Other Office and Administrative Support Workers  10 -13.9 -253,106 
Administrative Services Managers  12  -25.8  -43,723    Order, Receptionist and Information Clerks  10  -22.4  -162,705 
Marine Engineers and Naval Architects  12  8.5  202    Switchboard Operators, Including Answering Service  10 -23.4 -22,205 
Computer Systems Analysts  12  -22.1  -75,292    Material Record., Sched., Dispatch., and Distrib. Work.  10  26.9  473,753 
Computer Programmers  12 -25.6 -104,111    Retail  Salespersons  10 -2.4  -92,927 
Mining and Geological Engineers  12  76.6  911    Executive Secretaries and Administrative Assistants  9  30.6  286,391 
Industrial Engineers  12  26.0  30,175    Weighers, Measur., Check., and Samplers, Recordkeep.  9  22.1  7,951 
Materials Engineers  12  42.3  5,840    Telemarketers  9 -52.5  -162,966 
Database Administrators  12 3.8  2,113    Cashiers,  Except Gaming  9  -3.8  -110,445 
Agricultural Engineers  12  -58.3  -1,650    Total White-Collars     -6.0 -1,415,000 
Note: Author’ calculations based on Occupational Employment Statistics (BLS) 
Occupations in bold are defined as “tradeable”, because they show the following three features: 1) involvement in routine tasks that are repeated almost mechanically; 2) provision of impersonal services 
that do not require face-to-face contact; 3) production of services that can be easily transmitted from remote destinations with low degradation of quality. 
School is the level of education required, on average, to perform each occupation. Legend: 9= High-school graduate; 10= Some college, not degree; 11= Vocational or technical degree; 12= Associate 
degree in college; 13= Bachelor’s degree; 14= Master’s degree; 15= Professional school degree; 16= Doctorate degree (Source: 5% 2004 PUMS) 
 Table 4 reports the list of white-collar occupations, with the corresponding average level of school-
ing and the change in employment between 1997 and 2002; tradeable occupations are shown in bold15.
As emphasized in previous studies (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), there is no clear relation-
ship between the tradeable nature of an occupation and its level of education: tradeable occupations
appear in fact in every skill group.
Almost 1.5 million white-collar jobs have been lost in the U.S. during the period of analysis.
This ￿gure is consistent with those reported in Forrester Research (2003), Kirkegaard (2004) and
Blinder (2006)16. The overall decline in white-collar employment has been extremely widespread
across occupations. Nevertheless, two interesting pieces of evidence emerge. First high-skilled white-
collar employment has increased, while medium- and low-skilled employment has declined17. Note,
however, that the increase in high-skilled employment has been driven only by ￿ve occupations: 1)
lawyers; 2) advertising, marketing, promotions, public relations and sales managers; 3) management
analysts; 4) aerospace engineers; 5) civil engineers. Second, with a limited number of exceptions, the
tradeable occupations have experienced employment declines.
2.3. Preliminary evidence
The period under study has witnessed several economic and political changes, that could have a⁄ected
the U.S. labor market independent of service o⁄shoring. Among these factors, Baily and Lawrence
(2004) cite the increase in oil prices, the appreciation of the dollar and the overall uncertainty that
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the war in Iraq. The e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring
have to be studied in isolation from these events. A preliminary analysis in this direction can be
conducted by estimating a log-linear (conditional) demand function for each of the 58 white-collar
occupations, conditioning the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on a large set of covariates. This function
takes the form:
lnen
jt = b0 + b1 ￿ lnwn
jt + b2 ￿ SOSSjt + b3 ￿ lnyjt + d0￿jt + %jt (2.1)
where n indexes occupations, j industries and t time, e is the number of employees, w is the wage,
y is output, ￿ is a vector of control variables and %jt is an idiosyncratic disturbance. The vector ￿
includes: time dummies, that capture the e⁄ects of year-speci￿c macroeconomic and political factors
which are constant across industries; a proxy for technological progress, that accounts for the e⁄ects
of the introduction of new technologies; the level of output, that controls for scale e⁄ects; a proxy for
material o⁄shoring, that controls for the fact that some white-collar jobs may be relocated abroad as
a result of o⁄shoring of intermediate inputs18. Finally, all variables enter in deviation from industry-
speci￿c means, to control for industry-speci￿c e⁄ects.
15The list of blue-collar occupations is available from the author upon request.
16Although apparently high in absolute terms, similar numbers do not seem as impressive if compared with the average
turnover occurring in the U.S. labor market: Baily and Farrell (2004) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006) report that the
average number of monthly job changes in the U.S. exceeds 2 million.
17Several other studies have documented similar trends by skill category (Mann, 2003; Kirkegaard, 2004; Jensen and
Kletzer, 2005; Feenstra, 2007).
18As an example, think of occupations like transportation and storage managers. These jobs may be moved abroad
when ￿rms decide to relocate the production of intermediate inputs. Without controlling for this possibility, these e⁄ects
may be captured by SOSS, and thus confounded with those of service o⁄shoring.
8Table 5 - Estimated Labor Demand Elasticities to Service Oﬀshoring for Selected Occupations - Log-Linear Model
Tradeable Occupations Elasticity Std. Err. Non Tradeable Occupations Elasticity Std. Err.
Market and survey researchers -0.0009 0.0062 Lawyers 0.0231 0.0104**
Accountants and auditors -0.0039 0.0022* Life scientists 0.0679 0.0785
Computer systems analysts -0.0143 0.0025*** Physical scientists 0.0092 0.0089
Computer programmers -0.0252 0.0046*** Engineering managers 0.0126 0.0064*
Database administrators -0.0143 0.0031*** Advertising, MKTG, Prom., Pub. Rel. and Sales Manag. 0.0076 0.0032**
Computer support specialists -0.0150 0.0031*** Computer hardware engineers 0.0248 0.0111**
Cost estimators -0.0163 0.0039*** Management analysts 0.0150 0.0071**
Statistical assistants -0.0265 0.0075*** Aerospace engineers 0.0095 0.0064
Financial clerks -0.0113 0.0054** Sales engineers 0.0057 0.0141
Information and record clerks -0.0133 0.0062** Mechanical engineers 0.0043 0.0111
Other oﬃce and administrative support workers -0.0121 0.0055** Civil engineers 0.0034 0.0056
Switchboard operators, including answering service -0.0063 0.0034* Chief executives 0.0070 0.0032**
Telemarketers -0.0153 0.0106 Financial managers 0.0059 0.0023***
Purchasing managers 0.0017 0.0029
Administrative services managers 0.0101 0.0023***
Budget analysts 0.0164 0.0045***
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. *signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.The estimated (conditional) labor demand elasticities to service o⁄shoring are reported in Table A1,
together with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors19. I start commenting upon the elasticities
along the ￿rst dimension of analysis, that is by looking at the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring across
skill categories. Interestingly, the vast majority (11 out of 15) of occupations in the high-skilled
group are characterized by positive elasticities to service o⁄shoring; 5 of these elasticities are also
signi￿cant at conventional levels, whereas only 1 of the negative elasticities is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero (accountants and auditors). At the same time, there is some (less startling) evidence of a
concentration of negative elasticities in the medium- and low-skilled groups: out of 43 occupations, 26
are characterized by negative elasticities; out of these, 13 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Within each skill group, however, there is high heterogeneity in the response of speci￿c occupations.
Some of this heterogeneity seems to depend on the di⁄erences in tradeable features across occupations.
In Table 5, I report a selection of elasticities including all the tradeable occupations and a sub-
sample of non tradeable occupations; the latter includes highly complex, specialized and technical
jobs, like lawyers, life and physical scientists, chief executives, ￿nancial managers, aerospace engineers,
management and budget analysts. The elasticities are always negative for the tradeable occupations
and always positive for the selected non tradeable occupations. In the vast majority of cases, the
elasticities are also signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. As suggested by previous studies, this shows
that tradeable occupations face negative employment e⁄ects from service o⁄shoring, independent of
their level of education. At the same time, service o⁄shoring seems to stimulate employment in very
complex and highly specialized non tradeable occupations. These latter e⁄ects have generally been
neglected in the previous literature.
The approach based on equation (2.1) has several advantages. First, it is computationally simple.
Second, estimates of (conditional) labor demand elasticities to service o⁄shoring coincide with a single
parameter, b2. The approach, however, has also several limitations. First, due to the high fraction of
zero observations that plague the employment data, the log transformation causes signi￿cant losses
of observations and estimated parameters are inconsistent. Second, the severe loss of observations
limits the number of parameters that can be identi￿ed. In particular, the number of observations
is generally too small to estimate all the cross-wage elasticities. Hence, I have insofar excluded any
substitutability / complementarity among occupations by setting these elasticities equal to zero. With
a high level of detail on the employment variable, such an assumption is far too restrictive. For these
reasons, the estimates presented in this section should only be taken as suggestive. In the next section,
I will develop a structural model of the ￿rm￿ s behavior that allows to overcome both limitations of
the log-linear approach.
3. A model of the ￿rm￿ s behavior
The model presented in this section is similar to the one developed by Fuss (1977). The main con-
tribution of the paper is to generalize the representation of the technology given therein, in order to
allow service o⁄shoring to a⁄ect the optimization process of the ￿rms and, through this channel, the
demand function for each occupation.
The model is based on two assumptions. First, the technology of the ￿rms satis￿es Homothetic
19The remaining set of estimated parameters from equation (2.1) are available from the author upon request.
9Weak Separability (HWS) in the 13 major occupational groups reported in Table 320. Second, service
o⁄shoring enters the technology as a shift-factor, that is as a variable which is out of the ￿rm￿ s control
during the optimization process, but nevertheless a⁄ects the latter by determining the exact position
of the technological frontier. This assumption is nowadays standard in studies of the e⁄ects of trade
and technology on labor demand and wage inequality21.
HWS implies that changes in the level of employment of a minor occupation do not a⁄ect the
marginal rate of technical substitution between any pair of occupations that belong to a di⁄erent
major group22. Under HWS, therefore, the relationship between occupations in the same group is
unrestricted. The relationship between occupations in di⁄erent groups is instead restricted in the
following way: if the occupations in a group become relatively more expensive, ￿rms will substitute
away from them by rising proportionally the demand for all minor occupations in a di⁄erent group23.
Exploiting HWS, the demand functions for the minor occupations can be retrieved by breaking
down the ￿rm￿ s optimization process in two stages: in the ￿rst stage, ￿rms choose the optimal occu-
pational mix in each major group; in the second stage, they choose the optimal level of employment
in each major group. I will exploit this results, known as Two-Stage Optimization (TSO), to keep
derivation of labor demand elasticities tractable24.
3.1. The model
3.1.1. Primal representation of the technology under HWS
I assume that each industry j can be described by a representative ￿rm with a twice di⁄erentiable and
strictly quasi-concave production function. Output (Y ) depends on labor, L, and a vector of non-labor
inputs ￿ with generic entry ￿r25. The labor input consists of major occupational groups - indexed by
the superscript i = 1;:::;I - each of which can in turn be distinguished in minor occupations indexed
by the subscript n = 1;:::;N. I will refer to the n-th minor occupation in the i-th major group as Li
n.








I assume that (3.1) exhibits positive marginal products of all inputs, satis￿es the Hicksian stability
conditions and is homothetically weakly separable in the major occupational groups. Under HWS,
(3.1) can be re-expressed as Yj = f
￿
’1;:::;’i;:::;’I;￿0￿
, where the ’i = ’(Li
1;:::;Li
N) are homothetic
20Each group contains occupations that perform homogeneous tasks: managerial activities, business and ￿nancial
operations, etc..
21See, among others, Berman et al. (1994) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999).
22For instance, the marginal rate of technical substitution between two managerial occupations is not a⁄ected by
changes in the number of any type of production workers.
23This assumption could in principle be tested [see, among others, Woodland (1978), Moschini (1992), Diewert and
Wales (1995) and Koebel (2006) for tests of HWS]. Unfortunately, formal tests are unfeasible in my case due to the high
level of occupational detail, which restricts dramatically the number of degrees of freedom, and thus the power, of those
tests. Nevertheless, previous studies have convincingly argued that HWS is likely to hold when working with narrowly
de￿ned occupations (Weiss, 1977).
24TSO has mainly been exploited in consumption theory to derive optimal demand functions for highly disaggregated
goods [see Edgerton (1997) for an example]. In production theory, it has been applied to study optimal demand for
di⁄erent types of energy by Fuss (1977), Denny et al. (1982), Woodland (1993), Chakir et al. (2004).
25Non labor inputs include, capital, energy and non-energy materials.
10aggregator functions (quantity indexes) for the minor occupations in each group26.
3.1.2. From the primal to the dual: the short-run cost function




N;p0;Y ), which is twice di⁄erentiable in the wages of the minor occupations





N;p0;Y ) = C(#1;:::;#i;:::;#I;p0;Y )
where the #i = #(wi
1;:::;wi
N) are homothetic aggregators (wage-indexes) for the wages of the minor
occupations in each group. Because HWS implies this alternative representation of the cost function,
the optimal demand for each occupation can be derived in two stages: in stage (1), ￿rms choose the
optimal occupational mix within each major group, by minimizing the value of all the aggregators; in
stage (2), ￿rms choose the optimal level of employment in each group, by minimizing the cost function.
Hence, HWS implies that TSO is consistent.
I now generalize the above results to include service o⁄shoring and to deal with lack of information
on the price of capital. Following previous studies (Berman et al., 1994), I employ a short-run cost
function, in which capital is treated as a quasi-￿xed factor. In this set-up, derivation of optimal
demand functions will be conditioned upon the (observable) level of the capital stock, k. I further
assume that, along with k, the short-run optimization process is conditioned upon a set of shift-factors,
including service o⁄shoring, material o⁄shoring, a proxy for technological progress and time-dummies.
Without loss of generality, I collect k and all the shift-factors into the vector z, with generic entry zu.
The short-run cost function is de￿ned as CSR(w1
1;:::;wi
n;:::;wI
N;p0;Y ;z0). The following result holds.














In this framework, service o⁄shoring a⁄ects the optimization process of the ￿rm. At the same
time, TSO can still be used to keep derivation of labor demand functions tractable.
Lemma 1 has clear implications on how service o⁄shoring (SOSS) a⁄ects the optimization process.
Because z appears as an argument in both the short-run cost function and the aggregators, a change
in SOSS exerts two e⁄ects on the optimal demand function for each minor occupation. First, ￿rms
will re-optimize the employment mix within each major group. Second, they will adjust the overall
level of employment in each major group. Take the generic n-th occupation in major group i and
26For more details, see Gorman (1959), Green (1964) and Blackorby et al. (1978).
11denote with ￿i
n;SOSS and ￿i;SOSS the former and the latter e⁄ect, respectively. ￿i
n;SOSS measures
the percentage change in the employment of n following a one percentage change in SOSS, holding
￿xed the level of employment in group i; that is, ￿i
n;SOSS ￿ @ logLi
n=@SOSSjLi=Li. ￿i;SOSS measures
instead the percentage change in the level of employment in group i. The expression for ￿i;SOSS is
fairly complicated: the e⁄ect of a change in SOSS on the level of employment in group i is in fact the
combination of two additional terms: a direct e⁄ect, which depends on the presence of SOSS as an
independent argument of the cost function in (3.2), and an indirect e⁄ect, which works through the














The ￿rst term measures the direct e⁄ect. The square-bracketed term measures the indirect e⁄ect; the
generic argument of the summation is the product between the own (cross) price elasticity of demand
for group i and the change induced by SOSS in the corresponding aggregator. Finally, ￿i
n;SOSS and
￿i;SOSS can be combined to get the expression for the labor demand elasticity of occupation n:
{n;SOSS = ￿n;SOSS + si
n ￿ ￿i;SOSS (3.5)
where si
n is the share of occupation n in the wage bill of group i27.
3.1.3. Functional forms
I follow Fuss (1977) and Moschini (1992) and specify a Flexible and Separable Translog (FAST) model
for equations (3.2) and (3.3). The FAST model o⁄ers a non-nested framework in which HWS can be
combined with the ￿ exible nature of the translog. In this way, imposing HWS does not cause loss of
￿ exibility28.
Under FAST, the short-run cost function in (3.2) has the following form:

















































































27A similar espression can be found in Fuss (1975).









0). It is well known, however, that these restrictions would destroy the ￿ exibility of the
translog and force the wage aggregators to have a Cobb-Douglas representation, with a constant unitary elasticity of
substitution among minor occupations (Berndt and Christensen, 1974; Blackorby et al., 1977; Denny and Fuss, 1977).























Following Fuss (1977), it can be shown that this representation yields exact Divisia indexes for the
wages of the minor occupations in each major group.
Lemma 2. Given z a vector of shift-factors and quasi-￿xed inputs, the correct speci￿cation for the
Divisia index is the one in equation (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Lemma 2 is important in the light of the very well know properties of the Divisia
index. Hulten (1973) has shown that, if aggregate price indexes exist and are linear homogeneous,
their true values can be retrieved through a Divisia index29.
With equations (3.6) and (3.7) at hand, I now solve the two-stage optimization process. Stage (1)
requires to minimize each aggregator in (3.7) with respect to the level of employment in the minor
occupations. Exploiting Shepard￿ s Lemma, this yields I systems of wage-share equations of the form:
si








jt 8 n and 8i (3.8)
where si
n;jt is the share of occupation n in the total wage bill of group i30. Stage (2) can be performed
similarly, by minimizing (3.6) with respect to the level of employment in each major group and to the
level of non labor inputs. By Shepard￿ s Lemma, this yields the following system of share equations:
S
i(r)
















jt is the share of major group i (non labor input r) on total variable costs31.
Estimation of the systems in (3.8) and (3.9) is computationally feasible, because each system
contains a moderate number of equations32. The estimated parameters can be used to compute labor
demand elasticities to service o⁄shoring for each minor occupations. This requires to specialize
equation (3.5) to the translog case. The ￿rst term of (3.5), ￿i
n;SOSS, has the following expression33:
29Similar representations for the aggregators can be found in Denny et al. (1982) and Jorgenson and Stocker (1982).
30Linear homogeneity in prices and symmetry imply the following restrictions: PN
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n=1 ￿nu = 0;￿nm = ￿mn




































￿ru = 0;￿iq = ￿qi;air = ari = ￿rs = ￿sr:
32The largest system in (3.8) is composed of twelve equations (minor occupations). The system in (3.9) contains ￿fteen
equations (thirtheen major groups and two non labor inputs).


































































are the translog for-





is the change in the aggregators induced by SOSS.
Summing up, this section has presented a model of the ￿rm￿ s behavior that yields formulas for
the labor demand elasticity of each minor occupation, while allowing for a ￿ exible structure of substi-
tutability / complementarity among occupations. To this purpose, the model exploits HWS and TSO.
By assuming a FAST representation, I have characterized the ￿rst-stage of the optimization process
with I systems of wage-share equations; the second-stage is instead characterized by just one system.
Each system contains a moderate number of equations, which makes estimation tractable.
4. Estimation strategy
The stochastic version of the systems in (3.8) and (3.9) is
si









n;jt + cj (4.1)
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i(r)













jt + cj (4.2)
The term cj is an industry-speci￿c component accounting for individual heterogeneity, while "i
n;jt
and ￿i
jt are idiosyncratic disturbances, that satisfy the following properties:
Property 1 E(￿i
jt) = 0 and E("i
n;jt) = 0 8j;t;i;n.
Property 2 E(""0) = ￿ = ￿" ￿ IJT where ￿" = [￿nm
" ]. IJT is an identity matrix of order JT; n and
m are two generic equations from (4.1)34.
E(￿￿0) = ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ IJT where ￿￿ = [￿
iq
￿ ]. IJT is an identity matrix of order JT; i and q
are two generic equations from (4.2).
34The dimension of ￿" is system speci￿c, and equal to the number of equations in each system.













where ￿ = E(￿"0) = ￿￿" ￿ IJT and ￿￿" = [￿in
￿"]
These properties imply that the idiosyncratic disturbances are jointly normally distributed with
zero mean, and correlated both across the equations of each system and across the two stages of the
model35.
Estimation of (4.1) and (4.2) is complicated by the high-degree of censoring of the dependent
variables. This would make SUR estimates inconsistent. Censoring arises either from corner solutions
or from the use of designated technologies. Estimation under designated technologies is unfeasible
with a large number of occupations36. I therefore assume that censoring arises from corner solutions.
Under this assumption, three alternative estimation approaches are available. I rely on the panel data
version of the Amemiya (1974) Tobit model proposed by Meyerhoefer et al. (2005)37. In its original
version, the Amemiya￿ s estimator cannot be used with panel data: because the Tobit model is non
linear, individual heterogeneity cannot be wiped out by ￿rst-di⁄erencing or mean-di⁄erencing, and
thus the conditional distribution of the dependent variable depends on the unobserved heterogeneity
component even after the transformation and parameters estimates are inconsistent. This issue is
known as "incidental parameters problem" (Neyman and Scott, 1948). Meyerhoefer et al. (2005)
have shown that the Amemiya￿ s Tobit model can be easily extended to panel data, by specifying
a (conditional) distribution for the term of individual heterogeneity and using a Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (QMLE) to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters38. In the next section,
I will present a di⁄erent treatment of the QMLE, that can be used when the cross-sectional dimension
of the panel is moderately small, as usually is in studies using industry-level data39.
4.1. Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation
QMLE works in two steps. In the ￿rst step, a distribution for the term of individual heterogeneity
(cj) is speci￿ed and integrated out from the joint density function of each system; estimation is then
carried out on the marginal distributions of the dependent variables, conditional on the vector of re-
gressors. In practice, this task can be accomplished by substituting in each equation the expression for
35Cross-stage error correlation may seem inconsistent with HWS: some authors have indeed argued that, due to HWS,
errors should be uncorrelated across di⁄erent optimization stages, thereby yielding a fully block-recursive system (Bieri
and de Janvri, 1972). La France (1991) and Edgerton (1993) have however shown that cross-stage error correlation
is not inconsistent with HWS; rather, in order to obtain block-recursivity, one would need to impose very restrictive
assumptions on the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms.
36Designated technologies are technologies that do not employ some of the occupations. Since it is impossible to ￿gure
out the speci￿c technology of each industry, estimation is carried out by maximizing a likelihood function that includes all
possible combinations of occupations available to the ￿rm. For instance, with 3 occupations the ￿rm has 3
2 ￿2 available
options (assuming that at least one occupation has to be used in production). Clearly, the dimension of integration rises
dramatically with the number of occupations.
37The other two approaches have been proposed by Wales and Woodland (1983) and Lee and Pitt (1986) and exploit
primal and dual representations of the technology, based on Kuhn-Tucker conditions and virtual prices. These methods
are computationally cumbersome with large demand systems.
38QMLE was originally introduced in a single equation framework by White (1982) and subsequenlty extended by
Jakubson (1988).
39There are other solutions to the incidental parameters problems. In a parametric framework like that required
by QMLE, Muendler and Becker (2006) and Yen and Lin (2006) have developed estimators based on extensions of the
Heckman (1979) two-stage model. In a non-parametric framework, HonorŁ (1992) has shown that individual heterogeneity
can be wiped out by an appropriate "trimming" of the distribution of the dependent variable.
15the distribution of cj and then using standard Tobit estimation individually on each equation. Under
an appropriate and correctly speci￿ed distribution for cj, estimated parameters are consistent and
asymptotically normal (Wooldridge, 2002). In the second step, cross-equation restrictions like sym-
metry and linear homogeneity are imposed on the parameters through Minimum Distance Estimation
(MDE). One relevant piece of information for MDE is the metric used to compute the estimator. MDE
generally uses the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted parameters. However,
given that the latter have been estimated from the marginal distributions, the variance-covariance
matrix has to be corrected; to this purpose, standard results holding in a single equational context
(Wooldridge, 2002) can be generalized to a multi-equation framework.
My treatment of QMLE di⁄ers from that in Meyerhoefer et al. (2005) at both steps. In the ￿rst
step, the main di⁄erence lays in the speci￿cation of the distribution of cj. In the second step, the
main di⁄erence is the correction of the variance-covariance matrix. These departures from the original
version of the estimator make it more suitable for panel data of small cross-sectional dimension. After
presenting this version of the QMLE, I will brie￿ y compare it with the original one.
The most important aspect of the ￿rst step of QMLE is the speci￿cation of the distribution of cj.
First, notice that cj appears in the systems of equations at both stages of the model: the distribution of
cj must therefore be the same at each stage. Second, assumptions have to be made on the relationship
between cj and the explanatory variables: if cj were incorrectly assumed to be independent of the
regressors, parameter estimates would be inconsistent (Hsiao, 2003). I therefore assume that cj has
conditional distribution depending on the subset of regressors that appear at both stages of the model.
Speci￿cally, I assume that the conditional distribution of cj can be represented by a linear projection





j + ￿j (4.3)
where ￿u are parameters to be estimated and ￿j is a projection error uncorrelated with all the ex-
planatory variables and satisfying ￿j￿N(0;￿j) and E(￿j￿i
jt) = E(￿j"i
n;jt) = 0 8j;i;n;t. Notice one
important implication of equation (4.3): any correlation between the error term and the shift- and
quasi-￿xed factors is accounted for by the group means. Hence, this approach wipes out any potential
endogeneity of these regressors arising from correlation between them and the term of unobserved
heterogeneity.
The speci￿ed distribution for cj has to be integrated out from the joint density function of each
system of equations. This simply requires substituting (4.3) into (4.1) and (4.2). Substitution yields
reduced forms of the structural equations:
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40This formulation has originally been proposed by Mundlak (1978).
16where $i
jt = ￿i
jt + ￿j and ￿i
n;jt = "i





equation in the systems (4.4) and (4.5) contains the same regressors and individual heterogeneity
has been integrated out, equation-by-equation pooled Tobit estimation yields consistent and
p
J -
asymptotically normal estimates of the reduced-form parameters ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿￿ and ￿$ (Wooldridge,
2002).
In the second step of QMLE, I use MDE to impose symmetry and homogeneity restrictions on
the reduced-form parameters. I focus the exposition of MDE on the systems in (4.4); MDE on (4.5)
will proceed along the same lines. Collect the reduced-form parameters from (4.4) into the vector
￿ of dimension ￿ ￿ 1, with ￿ = N ￿ (N + 2U + 2). N is the number of equations in the system
and U is the number of shift- and quasi-￿xed factors; the constant term and the error variance ￿￿
justify the 2 additional parameters. The total number of restrictions to be imposed is N(N ￿ 1)=2 +
(N +U +1)+(N ￿1)U: N(N ￿1)=2 are the symmetry restrictions; N +U +1 are the homogeneity
restrictions; (N ￿ 1)U are the restrictions needed to make the conditional distribution of cj constant
across equations. De￿ne with ￿ the mapping between ￿ and the structural (restricted) parameters
￿￿, such that ￿ = ￿(￿￿); the Jacobian of the transformation ￿(￿) has full column rank equal to
￿ ￿ N(N ￿ 1)=2 ￿ (N + U + 1) ￿ (N ￿ 1)U. Given the linear nature of the restrictions, I specialize
￿(￿￿) to a linear function; hence, ￿ = H￿￿, where H is a matrix of linear restrictions with dimension
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ N(N ￿ 1)=2 ￿ (N + U + 1) ￿ (N ￿ 1)U). MDE is carried out by ￿nding the vector b ￿
￿
that




￿￿ [b ￿ ￿ H￿￿]0b ￿￿1[b ￿ ￿ H￿￿] (4.6)
where a "hat" indicates an estimated variable and ￿ is the variance-covariance matrix of b ￿.
b ￿ has to be corrected to account for the fact that b ￿ has been obtained using the marginal distribu-
tions of the dependent variables; this does not allow to account for two types of correlation in the scores
of the joint likelihood function. First, the scores are correlated across the equations of each system,
but this correlation is missed because of equation-speci￿c estimation. Second, the scores are serially
correlated, but this correlation is missed because of the use of a pooled Tobit estimator. I correct the
variance-covariance matrix by generalizing results in Wooldridge (2002, p. 406) to a multi-equation
context. De￿ne with ￿n the sub-vector of ￿ containing only the reduced-form parameters from the
n-th equation in (4.4). Wooldridge (2002, p. 406) shows that the corrected variance-covariance matrix
of ￿n has expression J￿1(A￿1
n BnA￿1
n ), with An = ￿E[O2




gjt(￿n); l and g represent, respectively, the log-likelihood of the pooled Tobit model
and its score. Matrix Bn takes account of serial correlation in the score. Consistent estimators of















j = [gj(b ￿1)0;:::;gj(b ￿N)0] stacks scores of di⁄erent equations. b B takes account of both serial cor-
relation in the score of each equation and correlation among scores of di⁄erent equations. With this
matrix at hand, I ￿nally construct b ￿ as:
b ￿ = b A￿1b Bb A￿1
17where b A = blockfb A1;:::; b An;:::; b ANg41.
Meyerhoefer et al. (2005) specify a di⁄erent distribution for cj, by assuming that it depends on
all the lags and leads of all the regressors [as in Chamberlain (1980, 1982)]. This implies that the
estimation of b ￿ has to be performed cross-section by cross-section and on each equation separately.
This may be unfeasible in panels with small cross-sectional dimension. The formulation in (4.3) allows
instead to exploit pooled Tobit estimation, thereby increasing the number of degrees of freedom at the
￿rst stage of QMLE. This however requires a di⁄erent correction for the variance-covariance matrix
at the second stage42.
I use the estimated structural parameters to compute the elasticities of labor demand to service
o⁄shoring for each of the 58 white-collar occupations. Equations (3.10) and (3.11) give the deter-
ministic expressions for the two components of these elasticities. The stochastic expressions can be
retrieved from (3.10) and (3.11) by replacing observed shares with their expectations, and translog
parameters with the marginal e⁄ects of the associated variables. The expectation of si
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is the vector of estimated structural parameters from equation n, x
collects all the observable regressors (wages and shift- and quasi-￿xed factors) and z contains group
means of the shift- and quasi-￿xed factors. The marginal e⁄ect of the generic k-th element of x (xk)
can be computed by di⁄erentiating E(si
















The stochastic expressions of the labor demand elasticities vary across industries and over time; in
what follows, I will report averages over the entire sample.
4.2. Instrumenting the wage indexes at the second stage
Lemma 2 states that (3.7) is the correct speci￿cation for the Divisia index of the wages of the minor

















Substituting (4.7) into (3.9) yields:
41Estimation has been carried out by using the tobit routine in Stata (version 9.2) for retrieving the b ￿. A modi￿cation
of the SAS code written by Meyerhoefer et al. (2005) has been used to implement the MDE and obtain the b ￿
￿
.
42See Meyerhoefer (2002) for the detailed derivation of the corrected variance-covariance matrix under the Chamber-
lain￿ s speci￿cation of the distribution of cj.
43See the Appendix for details.
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Clearly, the form of the wage indexes implies that the si
n;jt appear both as explained variables at the
￿rst stage of the model and as explanatory variables at the second44. As a consequence, the wage
indexes are endogenous. This requires an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters at the second stage (Fuss, 1977; Edgerton et al, 1996). Following Fuss
(1977), I will exploit estimated parameters from the ￿rst stage to construct the ￿tted values of the
wage indexes, and use the latter in place of the true values in the estimation of the second stage.
5. Results
The estimated labor demand elasticities to service o⁄shoring ({n;SOSS) are reported in Table A245.
Not surprisingly, the size of the {n;SOSS di⁄ers (sometimes substantially) from that of the estimates
obtained with the log-linear model. This happens because the log-linear model does not account for
the substitutability / complementarity among occupations and produces inconsistent estimates due
to the high degree of censoring in the employment variable. With a very few exceptions, however, the
signs of the elasticities are the same across the two estimation methods.
Before commenting on the results, I check the regularity conditions of the cost function in (3.6)
and discuss the statistical properties of the elasticities.
5.1. Regularity conditions and statistical properties of the elasticities
Verifying regularity conditions on the cost function is important when working with aggregators of
detailed inputs: the restrictions may in fact fail to hold on the aggregates (Koebel, 2002). Since I
have restricted the parameters of (3.6) to satisfy linear homogeneity in prices and symmetry, the only
theoretical restrictions to be tested are monotonicity and concavity. Monotonicity holds if the predicted
values of S
i(r)
jt are non negative for each industry in each time period; while I do not report these
results to save space, exploration of the ￿tted shares shows that monotonicity is satis￿ed. Concavity
holds if and only if the Hessian matrix of the cost function (i.e. the matrix of price elasticities) is
negative semi-de￿nite; a necessary condition for negative semi-de￿niteness is that all principal minors
of the Hessian are negative. Following previous studies (Hijzen et al., 2005), I base my test on the
mean price elasticities, obtained by averaging out the observation-speci￿c elasticities over the entire
sample46. Results reported in the Appendix show that all principle minors of the Hessian are negative.
The {n;SOSS are complex non linear combinations of the parameters from the two stages of the
44See Fuss (1977) for a more detailed discussion on this point.
45The labor demand elasticities to the remaining shift factors are available from the author upon request.
46In the translog case, concavity is a local property, and should therefore be checked at each observation; in general,
however, concavity is unlikely to hold over the entire sample. Therefore, existing studies have usually checked concavity
on average.
19model. Hence, analytical standard errors cannot be computed. In order to discuss the statistical
properties of the elasticities, I therefore report estimates of their main components [as de￿ned in
equations (3.10) and (3.11)], for which analytical standard errors can be retrieved through the delta
method. Column 1 and 2 of Table A3 report the estimated ￿n;SOSS with the corresponding standard
errors. Two thirds of the estimates are signi￿cant at conventional levels47. ￿n;SOSS measures the
percentage employment change in the n-th occupation induced by a 1% increase in service o⁄shoring,
for ￿xed levels of employment in the corresponding major group. The e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on
the level of employment in each major group are instead measured by ￿i;SOSS. In turn, this term is
equal to the sum of two components - a direct e⁄ect and an indirect e⁄ect -, as shown in (3.11). Column
3 and 4 of Table A3 report estimates of the direct e⁄ect, aiSOSS=Si
jt, with the associated standard
errors. With the only exception of "Sales and Related Occupations", all estimates are signi￿cant.
Column 5 combines the direct e⁄ect with the indirect e⁄ects to yield the ￿nal estimates of ￿i;SOSS.
The contribution of the indirect e⁄ect is negligible: for no group do the ￿i;SOSS show a change in sign
relative to the direct e⁄ect; moreover, the size of the ￿i;SOSS is mostly determined by the direct e⁄ect.
5.2. The e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring
E⁄ects by skill group A simple look at Table A2 reveals that an overwhelming fraction of high-
skilled occupations (11 out of 15) are characterized by positive elasticities to service o⁄shoring. All of
the high-skilled occupations whose employment has increased between 1997 and 2002 show positive
elasticities: service o⁄shoring has therefore contributed to raising employment in these occupations.
At the same time, elasticities are positive also for many of the occupations whose employment has
declined: life and physical scientists, engineering managers, computer hardware engineers, sales and
mechanical engineers. Service o⁄shoring has therefore prevented additional job losses in these occu-
pations. Evidence is less startling for the medium- and low-skilled occupations, even though there is a
higher concentration of negative elasticities in these groups: the number of negative elasticities equals
24, out of a total number of 43 occupations.
In Table 6, I report estimated coe¢ cients and marginal e⁄ects from probit and logit regressions of
a dummy equal to 1 if an elasticity is positive, on indicator variables for the three skill categories. The
omitted group is the low-skilled, so that results have to be interpreted as di⁄erences in the probability
of ￿nding a positive elasticity when moving from the low-skill category to the other two. Standard
errors are obtained with a bootstrap resampling method and based on 2000 replications. The Table
clearly shows that the probability of ￿nding a positive elasticity is higher (38%) in the high-skill group,
whereas it is statistically indistinguishable between medium- and low-skilled occupations.
47I cannot compute ￿n;SOSS for the lawyers, because this occupation is the only one that appears in the major group
"Legal Occupations".
20Table 6 - Service O⁄shoring and Skill Intensity - Probit and Logit Results
Coe¢ cients Probit Logit
High skilled 1.0537 1.7047
[0.4584]** [0.8882]*





High skilled 0.3853 0.3824
[0.1430]*** [0.1712]**





Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the labor demand elasticity to service o⁄shoring
({n;SOSS) is positive; the explanatory variables are dummies for the three skill groups (omitted category: low
skilled). Bootstrapped standard errors obtained with 2000 replications in brackets. * signi￿cant at 10%; **
signi￿cant at 5*; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
I will now use the estimated elasticities to quantify the net employment e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring
on the three skill groups. To this purpose, I will simulate a counterfactual world in which service
o⁄shoring stayed constant at the 1997 levels. I will compute the number of jobs that would have
existed in each skill group in 2002 and subtract them from the employment levels actually observed in
that year. A positive number will therefore indicate that service o⁄shoring has increased employment,
ceteris paribus. Table 7 report the results. Service o⁄shoring has produced positive net e⁄ects on the
high-skilled and negative net e⁄ects on the other two groups. High-skilled white-collar employment
was 2% higher than it would have been if service o⁄shoring remained at the 1997 levels; medium-
and low-skilled employment were instead lower by 0.1% and 0.4%, respectively. I also report the
corresponding numbers of jobs created / destroyed by service o⁄shoring in each skill group. These
numbers are only suggestive. The simulation exercise is based on the assumption that the labor
demand elasticities remained constant along the growth path of service o⁄shoring; in the translog
case, however, the elasticities measure local e⁄ects, so that such an assumption may be excessively
unrealistic.
21Table 7 - Counterfactual Experiment
Skill Group Implied e⁄ect of Service O⁄shoring in 2002
% #
High skilled 2.0 49,009
Medium skilled -0.1 -2,863
Low skilled -0.4 -62,176
Total white-collars -0.1 -16,030
Note: The experiment uses the estimated labor demand elasticities to service o⁄shoring reported in Table
A2 to simulate a counterfactual world in which service o⁄shoring stayed constant at the 1997 levels. A positive
number indicates that employment was higher in 2002 than it would have been if service o⁄shoring actually
remained at the 1997 levels. In that case, service o⁄shoring raised employment ceteris paribus.
These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence reported in Bhagwati et al. (2004): the
authors suggest that, by o⁄shoring low skill-intensive service activities, U.S. ￿rms have been able to
a⁄ord new projects that would otherwise have been ￿nancially unfeasible; this has raised employment
and wages for highly quali￿ed white-collar workers48. The e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on each skill
group are however quite small in magnitude. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, the
size of the elasticities is small. On the other hand, there is high heterogeneity in the response of
speci￿c occupations, so that negative (positive) e⁄ects on some of them are compensated by positive
(negative) e⁄ects on others. Where does this heterogeneity come from? In the next section I discuss
one of the possible sources: the di⁄erence in tradeable features across occupations.
E⁄ects on tradeable and non tradeable occupations Table 8 reports the elasticities for the
same selection of occupations used in section 2.3. The Table strongly con￿rms the main evidence
emerged therein: independent of the skill level, service o⁄shoring negatively a⁄ects the tradeable
occupations and expands employment in non tradeable jobs performing very complex, specialized and
technical activities. Elasticities are in fact negative for all the tradable occupations and positive for
all the selected non tradeable occupations.
Consistent with previous studies, these results show that tradeable features matter substantially
in determining the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring: occupations whose services can be traded face nega-
tive e⁄ects from service o⁄shoring; this happens independent of their skill level. At the same time,
however, service o⁄shoring bene￿ts a large number of complex non tradeable jobs. This ￿nding brings
about interesting implications for the education system in a world of rising service o⁄shoring (see the
discussion below).
48Quoting the authors:
"The Information Management Consultants (IMC) of Reston, Virginia, several years ago considered pro-
ducing software that would allow biotech companies to exploit better the new human genome research.
The project seemed ￿nancially nonviable if undertaken entirely in the United States. But having its Indian
subsidiary do the bulk of the coding work made the project viable. The outcome was a thriving line of
business in bio-informatics for IMC and employment at six-￿gure salaries in the United States. For each
engineer in India, the ￿rm now employs six engineers in the United States (Bhagwati et al., 2004, p. 99).
22Table 8 - Estimated Labor Demand Elasticities to Service Oﬀshoring for Selected Occupations - Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Tradeable Occupations κn,SOSS Non Tradeable Occupations κn,SOSS
Market and survey researchers -0.0016 Lawyers 0.0722
Accountants and auditors -0.0200 Life scientists 0.0201
Computer systems analysts -0.0052 Physical scientists 0.0064
Computer programmers -0.0252 Engineering managers 0.0195
Database administrators -0.0066 Advertising, MKTG, Prom., Pub. Rel. and Sales Manag. 0.0023
Computer support specialists -0.0043 Computer hardware engineers 0.0589
Cost estimators -0.0117 Management analysts 0.0741
Statistical assistants -0.0181 Aerospace engineers 0.0113
Financial clerks -0.0182 Sales engineers 0.0206
Information and record clerks -0.1501 Mechanical engineers 0.0100
Other oﬃce and administrative support workers -0.0911 Civil engineers 0.0150
Switchboard operators, including answering service -0.1544 Chief executives 0.0028
Telemarketers -0.0009 Financial managers 0.0016
Purchasing managers 0.0102
Administrative services managers 0.0072
Budget analysts 0.0002
Note: Reported ﬁgures are averages over the entire sample. κn,SOSS measures the percentage employment change in occupation n after an 1% percentage change in service
oﬀshoring. This elasticity is computed as κn,SOSS = ξn,SOSS + si
n · ρi,SOSS,w h e r eξn,SOSS measures the percentage employment change in occupation n at given levels of
employment in major group i; ρi,SOSS measures the percentage employment change in major group i; si
n is the share of occupation n in the wagebill of major group i.E s t i m a t e s
of ξn,SOSS and ρi,SOSS are reported in Table A3, whereas average values of si
n are reported in Table A5.
2Overall, my ￿ndings show that: 1) Service o⁄shoring is "skilled biased", because it raises high-
skilled white-collar employment and lowers the number of medium- and low-skilled white-collar jobs;
2) Independent of their formal level of education, tradeable occupations are penalized by service
o⁄shoring; instead, service o⁄shoring usually bene￿ts complex and specialized non tradeable jobs. I
will now discuss the main implications of these results.
5.3. Discussion
There is a widespread concern that, by hurting the most skilled fraction of the workforce, service
o⁄shoring will lower the incentives to invest in education and slow down the process of human capital
accumulation in developed countries49. Indeed, on average, the white-collars are employed in jobs
that require high levels of education and pay high wages. Needless to say, however, that "on average"
hides a lot of heterogeneity. Some of the white-collars are very highly educated, others less. Only
in the least-skilled occupations does service o⁄shoring lower employment; in the most skilled, service
o⁄shoring actually boosts employment. This evidence is at odds with the above concern.
My results also show that the employment responses to service o⁄shoring di⁄er across occupations
with similar levels of formal education. In particular, tradeable occupations are always negatively
a⁄ected by service o⁄shoring; complex and highly specialized non tradeable jobs, instead, generally
bene￿t from it. Consistent with Blinder (2006), these ￿ndings suggest that service o⁄shoring is likely
to a⁄ect not only the level, but also the composition of educational demand. Along with a generic
stimulus to acquire tertiary education, service o⁄shoring may bring about a shift in educational demand
towards the programs and the degrees that allow workers to qualify for complex non tradeable jobs.
An important message of the above results, therefore, is that traditional classi￿cations of labor
into skill groups should be combined with information on the tradeable features of the occupations,
in order to capture the complex e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring. This is true for both empirical and
theoretical studies. Theoretical contributions have generally kept the two dimensions separate. A
￿rst set of models have adopted traditional de￿nitions of skills and given low weight to di⁄erences
in tradeable features across occupations (Bhagwati et al., 2004; Samuelson, 2004; Deardor⁄, 2005;
Markusen, 2005). A second set of models have instead stressed the role of tradeable features and of
the complexity of di⁄erent occupations (tasks), independent of the skill level of the workers (Antras
et al., 2006a,b; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). The ￿rst stream of literature produces the
clear-cut result that developed countries will increasingly specialize in high skill-intensive activities, as
service o⁄shoring rises50. The second set of models predict instead that highly complex non tradeable
activities will be retained domestically and will complement with more routine jobs performed abroad.
Both predictions seem to ￿nd empirical support in the results of this paper. It seems therefore possible
to combine the two views into a uni￿ed framework. Very recent theoretical models have indeed moved
in this direction (Markusen and Strand, 2007).
49See Tre￿ er (2005a,b), Blinder(2006) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006) for a detailed discussion.
50See also Tre￿ er (2005a,b) for a discussion on this point.
236. Conclusions and lines for further research
Service o⁄shoring has sharply increased in recent years and it will probably continue to rise in the near
future, thanks to improvements in information and communication technologies. The white-collars
are likely to bear the bulk of the employment e⁄ects. These workers have generally been shielded from
previous o⁄shoring episodes and are usually employed in "good jobs". Understanding the e⁄ects of
service o⁄shoring on white-collar employment has therefore become a relevant goal for international
trade economists.
In this paper, I have used a highly detailed database on occupational employment and wages for
the U.S. to address the following research questions: 1) What are the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring
across occupations of di⁄erent skill levels? 2) How do occupations with tradeable and non tradeable
features respond to service o⁄shoring?
I have presented a structural model of the ￿rm￿ s behavior, which allows for a relatively ￿ exible
structure of substitutability / complementarity across occupations, while keeping derivation of labor
demand elasticities fairly tractable. I have also proposed a variant of Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
Estimation, that accounts for high degrees of censoring and can be used in panel data of small cross-
sectional dimension.
My main ￿ndings are the following. Service o⁄shoring is skill-biased, because it raises aggregate
employment among high-skilled occupations and lowers aggregate employment among medium- and
low-skilled ones. Within each skill group, however, service o⁄shoring produces di⁄erent e⁄ects on
occupations with di⁄erent tradeable features. In particular, service o⁄shoring negatively a⁄ects the
tradeable occupations and tends to favor highly complex non tradeable jobs.
Several other issues remain to be investigated. First, it would be interesting to analyze the e⁄ects of
service o⁄shoring in other developed countries. Many Western European ￿rms have started o⁄shoring
service activities to Eastern Europe. European countries di⁄er signi￿cantly from the U.S. as far as
the structure of the labor market is concerned, so that the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on speci￿c
occupations may be di⁄erent on the two sides of the Atlantic. Second, the short-run approach of this
paper has prevented me from studying some indirect e⁄ects that service o⁄shoring may produce in
the long-run, by increasing the level of the capital stock and the scale of ￿rms￿operations. Since
capital usually complements with more skilled occupations (Griliches, 1969) and scale may be skill-
biased (Epifani and Gancia, 2006), these indirect e⁄ects may strengthen the short-run impact of
service o⁄shoring. Finally, service o⁄shoring may entail costs at the worker-level, which cannot be
quanti￿ed from industry-level data. When a worker is displaced by service o⁄shoring, she may incur
severe economic losses, in terms of wages and occupation￿ industry-speci￿c knowledge; such losses
may be aggravated by unfavorable re-employment outcomes (Jacobson et al., 1993; Kletzer, 1998).
The increasing availability of matched employer-employee databases can be exploited to study these
costs, by looking at e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on worker displacement and on the occupational and
industrial dynamics of worker ￿ ows.
Appendix
Data
This section provides additional details on data sources and variable de￿nitions.
24Occupational data The OES is an annual survey that covers approximately 400,000 establishments
each year over a total of 1.2 million establishments51. Each year survey is based on a probability
sample, strati￿ed by area, industry, and establishment size, designed to represent the total number of
establishments.
Employment and wage estimates for each year are obtained using survey results for that year and
for the previous two years, so that the estimates are always based on 3 years of sample data. Industry-
level employment ￿gures are computed from each survey as a weighted average of establishment
employment. Construction of industry level wage ￿gures is more complicated. For each occupation,
the survey asks establishments to report the number of employees that earn wages falling into one
of 12 contiguous intervals; for each interval, a mean wage rate is then computed. These mean wage
rates are used, together with the corresponding employment ￿gures for each interval, to compute
occupational wages as weighted averages of the mean wage rates. Finally, in order to retrieve wage
estimates for each year, data from the current survey are combined with that from the previous two
years. The latter are adjusted to take account of in￿ ation, by applying a weighting factor based on
the BLS Employment Cost Index.
The OES survey is based on the Standard Occupational Classi￿cation (SOC) system, which dis-
tinguishes occupations in 23 major groups (2-digit), each containing minor occupations at the 6-digit
level. The total number of minor occupations surveyed is 770. This ￿gure is much higher than the
number of occupations used in this paper. The reason is that the occupational classi￿cation method
employed by the BLS changed in 1999, with the adoption of the SOC system. Due to the change,
comparable wage estimates for the periods 1997-1998 and 1999-2002 are available only for 374 6-digit
SOC occupations. Out of this number, I restricted attention only to those occupations with positive
employment in at least one industry and in at least one year of the sample period; this yielded a total
number of 275 6-digit occupations.
Out of the 23 major groups, 10 consist of occupations that cannot be considered as productive
inputs in an even broadly de￿ned production process: "Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and
Media Occupations", "Community and Social Service Occupations", "Healthcare Support Occupa-
tions", "Military Speci￿c Occupations", "Education, Training and Library Occupations", "Protective
Service Occupations", "Farming, Fishing and Forestry Occupations", "Personal Care and Service Oc-
cupations", "Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations", "Food Preparation and Serving
Related Occupations"; these groups, moreover, are characterized by excessive presence of missing val-
ues. I therefore excluded these occupations from the analysis. The remaining 13 groups contain 229
6-digit SOC occupations. These occupations had to be merged with their counterparts for the period
1997-1998. Since a correspondence table is not available yet from the BLS, I merged occupations
based on the de￿nition of the main activity they perform (available from BLS)52. Finally, to make
the dimension of the problem tractable, I aggregated the 6-digit occupations into the corresponding
5-digit occupations. This yielded the ￿nal number of 112 occupations.
The OES report data on wages and employment both for the minor occupations and for the major
groups. The latter, however, are estimated considering also minor occupations for which employment
51Each establishment is surveyed once every three years, so that three years are necessary for the full number of
establishments to be surveyed.
52The correspondence scheme is available from the author upon request.
25and wage ￿gures are not reported to avoid disclosure. Hence, I estimated my own data for employment
and wages of the major groups, by taking into account only the minor occupations used in the analysis:
total employment for each major group, then, has been obtained as the sum of the number of employees
in the constituent minor occupations; average wages have been obtained as employment-weighted
averages of the wages of the minor occupations belonging to each major group.
Wage and employment estimates for these occupations are available for 140 3-digit SIC manufac-
turing industries and 9 service industries. Due to excessive number of missing values, 5 manufacturing
industries were excluded from the analysis, yielding the 135 industries reported in Table A453. Starting
from 2002, the NAICS classi￿cation replaced the SIC. Hence, OES started reporting data at 4- and 5-
digit NAICS levels. In order to make 2002 data comparable with earlier period estimates, I converted
the 4-digit NAICS data into 3-digit SIC industries based on the correspondence table provided by the
U.S. Census Bureau; wage estimates were computed as employment weighted averages of the wages
earned by each occupation in the NAICS sectors corresponding to each SIC industry.
Finally, for those occupations and industries with zero employment, the OES do not provide a wage
estimate. Hence, I assumed that ￿rms hire workers in each occupation based on the economy-wide
average wage for that occupation; that is, when ￿rms make decisions as to the number of workers to
hire, the expected cost to them for each occupation corresponds to the wage paid for that occupation
in the economy as a whole. Therefore, I replaced missing wage estimates for the occupations and
industries with zero employment with the economy-wide average wages for those occupations provided
in the national OES ￿les.
The upper part of Table A5 reports descriptive statistics on the wage-bill share of each of the
58 white-collar occupations and of each of the 13 major groups. The Table also reports the share of
each occupation in the economy-wide level of employment in 2002 and the percentage number of zero
employment observations, averaged out over the period 1997-2002. The degree of censoring varies
widely across occupations, ranging from values virtually close to zero to values exceeding the 95% of
observations54.
Material o⁄shoring Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), I proxy material o⁄shoring with








Yht + Mht ￿ Xht
where ￿97
jh is the input-output coe¢ cient giving the value of input h used in 1997 by industry j to
produce one dollar of its total output (Yjt), while Yht, Mht and Xht indicate, respectively, produc-
tion, imports and exports of input h. Input-output coe¢ cients are retrieved from the 1997 BEA
input-output matrix; data on imports and exports come from NBER (Feenstra et al., 2002); data on
industry output come from the U.S. Census Bureau ("Annual Survey of Manufactures") and BEA
("Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Data"), as explained below. Notice that this proxy has been
constructed di⁄erently from that of service o⁄shoring. The reason is that constructing the proxy for
service o⁄shoring in the same way as MOSS would require information on services production with
53The excluded industries are: Logging (241); Newspaper Publishing, or Publishing and Printing (271); Periodicals
Publishing, or Publishing and Printing (272); Miscellaneous Printing (274); Greetings Cards (277).
54Descriptive statistics for the blue-collar occupations are available from the author upon request.
26the same level of aggregation as the information on service imports and exports. Unfortunately, the
two classi￿cations di⁄er (see Table 1 and 2 in the text).
Technological progress The proxy for technological progress is the share of high-tech capital on
total capital stock. This proxy has been constructed as follows. First, I used data on private, non
residential, ￿xed assets provided by BEA at the 2-digit SIC level to calculate the share of high-
tech capital on total capital stock for each 2-digit industry in the manufacturing sector and for each
of the service industries; high-tech capital includes computer and peripheral equipment, software,
communications, photocopy and related equipment, o¢ ce and accounting equipment. Then, for the
service industries, I retrieved data on the total capital stock from BEA ("Gross-Domestic-Product-by-
Industry Data"); for the manufacturing industries, I calculated the total capital stock by extending
the series in the NBER Productivity Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996) through a perpetual
inventory method using data on investments in equipment and structures from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures and depreciation rates equal to 7.7 for equipment and 3.5 for structures (Amiti and Wei,
2006). Finally, I applied the shares of high-tech capital computed before to the total capital stock so
obtained for each industry.
Other variables Data on real output was obtained by de￿ ating the total value of shipments reported
in the Annual Survey of Manufactures with the price de￿ ator for shipments available from BEA
("Industry Economic Accounts ￿Supplemental Estimates"). Data on expenditures in materials and
electricity by 6-digit NAICS come from the Annual Survey of Manufactures; the latter provides also
information on the quantity of purchased electricity. I converted these ￿gures at the 3-digit SIC level
by means of the conversion table provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on the same variables
for the service industries come from BEA ("Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Data").
I computed the price de￿ ator for electricity by normalizing at one the average unit values in
200055. Computation of the non-energy material de￿ ator was more complicated. First I retrieved
nominal non-energy materials as di⁄erence between material costs and electricity expenditures. Then,
I de￿ ated material costs with the 2-digit SIC de￿ ator provided by BEA ("Industry Economic Accounts
￿Supplemental Estimates") and obtained real non-energy material costs as di⁄erence between real
material costs and real expenditures on electricity. Finally, by dividing nominal non-energy material
costs by real non-energy material costs I obtained an industry-level proxy for the price de￿ ator of
non-energy materials.
Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in the bottom part of Table A5.
Proofs
Lemma 1 Assume that CSR(w1
1;:::;wi
n;:::;wI
N;p0;Y ;z0) is weakly separable in the variable inputs
and that ￿rms choose the optimal amount of minor occupations in two stages. Due to the separability
assumption, at the ￿rst stage, for any given level of employment in each major group, ￿rms choose the
optimal demand for each minor occupation by looking only at the wages of the minor occupations in the
55Average unit values for electricity were obtained by dividing the cost of purchased electricity by the quantity of
purchased electricity.
27group and at the given level of the shift-factors and of the quasi-￿xed inputs. Total expenditure in ma-
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and z0]. Further assuming homotheticity of the ￿i implies that ￿i = h(Li ￿ ￿(wi
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is a positive monotonic transformation and ￿(wi
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N;z0) is linearly homogeneous in the vector of
wages:
Once the ￿rst stage of the optimization process has been solved, ￿rms choose the optimal num-
ber of employees in each major group and the optimal amount of non-labor inputs to minimize to-
tal costs. Hence, it will hold that CSR(￿1;:::;￿i;:::;￿I;p0;Y ;z0) = min
L1;:::;LI;￿0[
P
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N;p0;Y ;z0) has an equivalent representation in CSR(￿1;:::;￿i;:::;￿I;p0;Y ;z0)
with ￿i = ￿(wi
1;:::;wi
N;z0). As a result, TSO conditional upon z is consistent.
















where the subscript 0 indicates the base year of normalization (2000), in which all wages are set up to
1. From equation (3.8), this normalization implies si




jt, while from equation (3.7)
it implies ln￿i






























































Hence, in the presence of shift-factors and quasi-￿xed inputs, equation (3.7) is the correct speci￿cation
for the Divisia index of the wages of the minor occupations in each major group.
Estimated price elasticities matrix
This section reports the estimated price elasticities matrix for the translog cost function in equation
(3.6). Negative principal minors for this matrix (in bold) represent a necessary condition for the cost
function to be concave in input prices. Elasticities are computed for each industry in each time period
and then averaged out over the entire sample.
28P11 P13 P15 P17 P19 P23 P37 P41 P43 P47 P49 P51 P53 Pen Pnonen
P11 -0.745 -0.031 0.044 0.261 -0.271 0.142 -0.018 0.477 0.167 -0.561 -0.023 0.396 -0.127 -0.067 0.508
P13 -0.139 -0.241 -1.142 0.111 -0.018 0.104 0.185 0.069 1.502 -0.894 1.160 0.291 -0.171 -0.246 -0.416
P15 0.267 -1.458 -6.423 0.656 0.304 1.737 -0.937 0.085 -0.242 0.703 -2.512 1.862 -0.814 4.742 2.183
P17 0.484 0.046 0.209 -0.848 -0.187 0.319 0.055 -0.030 -0.128 -0.453 0.116 0.856 0.282 1.309 -1.878
P19 -1.216 -0.016 0.238 -0.454 -0.310 -0.589 0.056 -0.001 0.297 0.407 0.096 0.768 0.086 2.264 -1.474
P23 0.191 0.033 0.347 0.212 -0.144 -0.226 -0.002 -0.590 -0.209 0.646 -0.065 -0.661 0.051 -0.821 0.940
P37 -0.336 0.789 -3.116 0.566 0.235 -0.057 -0.215 0.233 0.045 -0.759 1.552 0.142 0.341 0.798 -0.066
P41 0.817 0.029 0.025 -0.021 0.001 -0.888 0.021 -1.024 0.117 -1.676 0.024 -0.669 0.030 1.770 1.598
P43 0.241 0.477 -0.062 -0.098 0.092 -0.284 0.003 0.093 -0.105 -0.976 0.173 0.580 -0.500 -1.557 1.864
P47 -0.725 -0.258 0.159 -0.317 0.117 0.722 -0.052 -1.300 -0.891 -0.523 0.176 -0.147 0.482 0.036 2.673
P49 -0.102 1.094 -1.856 0.264 0.087 -0.271 0.344 0.051 0.511 0.565 -0.143 -0.190 0.608 -0.299 -0.510
P51 0.157 0.026 0.126 0.183 0.066 -0.255 0.003 -0.164 0.160 -0.050 -0.017 -0.805 0.001 0.156 0.565
P53 -0.201 -0.061 -0.232 0.252 0.031 0.053 0.029 0.026 -0.570 0.601 0.236 0.018 -0.693 0.339 0.325
Pen -0.085 -0.070 1.057 0.909 0.642 -0.949 0.053 1.340 -1.402 0.031 -0.089 0.508 0.264 -1.755 -0.301
Pnonen 0.025 -0.003 0.016 -0.046 -0.016 0.014 0.000 0.037 0.059 0.089 -0.004 0.069 0.007 -0.010 -0.082
Estimated Price Elasticities Matrix for the Short-Run Translog Cost Function
Note: P11 = wage of group ￿Managers￿ ; P13 = wage of group ￿Business and Financial Operations￿ ; P15 =
wage of group ￿Computer and Mathematical Occupations￿ ; P17 = wage of group ￿Architecture and Engineering
Occupations￿ ; P19 = wage of group ￿Life, Physical and Social Sciences Occupations￿ ; P23 = wage of group
￿Legal Occupations￿ ; P37 = wage of group ￿Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations￿ ;
P41 = wage of group ￿Sales and Related Occupations￿ ; P43 = wage of group ￿O¢ ce and Administrative
Support Occupations￿ ; P47 = wage of group ￿Construction and Extraction Occupations￿ ; P49 = wage of group
￿Installation, Maintenance and Repair Occupations￿ ; P51 = wage of group ￿Production Occupations￿ ; P53 =
wage of group ￿Transportation and Material Moving Occupations￿ ; Pen = price index for electricity; Pnonen
= price index for non-energy materials.
29Table A1 – Estimated Labor Demand Elasticities to Service Offshoring – Log-Linear Model 
Occupation  Elasticity Std.  Err. 
High Skilled    
Lawyers  0.0231 0.0104** 
Life Scientists  0.0679 0.0785 
Physical Scientists  0.0092 0.0089 
Engineering managers  0.0126 0.0064* 
Advertising, Marketing, Promotions, Public Relations and Sales Managers 0.0076  0.0032** 
Petroleum engineers  -0.0080 0.0756 
Computer hardware engineers  0.0248  0.0111** 
Management analysts  0.0150 0.0071** 
Aerospace engineers  0.0095 0.0064 
Market and Survey Researchers  -0.0009 0.0062 
Sales engineers  0.0057 0.0141 
Mechanical engineers  0.0043 0.0111 
Civil engineers  0.0034 0.0056 
Accountants and auditors  -0.0039 0.0022* 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians  -0.0241  0.0081 
Medium Skilled    
Chief executives  0.0070 0.0032** 
Medical and health services managers  -0.0796  0.1175 
Financial managers  0.0059 0.0023*** 
Human Resources Managers  0.0016  0.0018 
Purchasing managers  0.0017 0.0029 
Administrative services managers  0.0101  0.0023*** 
Marine engineers and naval architects  -0.0817  0.2481 
Computer systems analysts  -0.0143 0.0025*** 
Computer programmers  -0.0252 0.0046*** 
Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers  -0.2672  0.3383 
Industrial Engineers, Including Health and Safety  -0.0071  0.0108 
Materials engineers  -0.0012 0.0098 
Database administrators  -0.0143 0.0031*** 
Agricultural engineers  -0.0030 0.0017* 
Budget analysts  0.0164 0.0045*** 
Compliance officers, except agriculture, construction, health and safety, and transportation  -0.0079  0.0067 
Advertising sales agents  0.0338 0.0110*** 
Human Resources, Training and Labor Relations Specialists  0.0088  0.0032*** 
Computer support specialists  -0.0150 0.0031*** 
Low Skilled     
Construction managers  0.0006 0.0035 
Industrial production managers  0.0023  0.0064 
Transportation, storage, and distribution managers  0.0014  0.0063 
Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing  0.0162  0.0051*** 
Cost estimators  -0.0163 0.0039*** 
Buyers and Purchasing Agents  -0.0042  0.0072 
Property, real estate, and community association managers -0.0869  0.0632 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support workers  0.0058  0.0028** 
Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters  0.0029  0.0120 
Drafters  0.0098 0.0109 
Statistical assistants  -0.0265 0.0075*** 
Demonstrators and product promoters  -0.0125  0.0049*** 
Financial Clerks  -0.0113 0.0054** 
Parts salespersons  -0.0028 0.0033 
Information and Record Clerks  -0.0133 0.0062** 
Other Office and Administrative Support Workers  -0.0121 0.0055** 
Order, receptionist and information clerks  0.0059  0.0043 
Switchboard operators, including answering service  -0.0063 0.0034* 
Material Recording, Scheduling, Dispatching, and Distributing Workers  -0.0114  0.0056** 
Retail salespersons  -0.0210 0.0110* 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants  0.0114  0.0027*** 
Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping  -0.0102  0.0062 
Telemarketers  -0.0153 0.0106 
Cashiers, except gaming  -0.0031 0.0063 
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
*significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. 
Occupations in bold are defined as “tradeable” (see note to Table 4). 
 
 
 Table A2 – Estimated Labor Demand Elasticities to Service Offshoring – Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Occupation   ϰn,SOSS 
High Skilled   
Lawyers  0.0722 
Life Scientists  0.0201 
Physical Scientists  0.0064 
Engineering managers  0.0195 
Advertising, Marketing, Promotions, Public Relations and Sales Managers  0.0023 
Petroleum engineers  -0.0922 
Computer hardware engineers  0.0589 
Management analysts  0.0741 
Aerospace engineers  0.0113 
Market and Survey Researchers  -0.0016 
Sales engineers  0.0206 
Mechanical engineers  0.0100 
Civil engineers  0.0150 
Accountants and auditors  -0.0200 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians  -0.0155 
Medium Skilled   
Chief executives  0.0028 
Medical and health services managers  -0.0649 
Financial managers  0.0016 
Human Resources Managers  0.0048 
Purchasing managers  0.0102 
Administrative services managers  0.0072 
Marine engineers and naval architects  0.2242 
Computer systems analysts  -0.0052 
Computer programmers  -0.0252 
Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers  0.0168 
Industrial Engineers, Including Health and Safety  -0.0215 
Materials engineers  -0.0118 
Database administrators  -0.0066 
Agricultural engineers  0.7575 
Budget analysts  0.0002 
Compliance officers, except agriculture, construction, health and safety, and transportation  0.0556 
Advertising sales agents  0.0696 
Human Resources, Training and Labor Relations Specialists  -0.0060 
Computer support specialists  -0.0043 
Low Skilled    
Construction managers  0.0049 
Industrial production managers  -0.0009 
Transportation, storage, and distribution managers  -0.0068 
Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing  0.0030 
Cost estimators  -0.0137 
Buyers and Purchasing Agents  -0.0117 
Property, real estate, and community association managers  -0.0003 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support workers  0.1323 
Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters  0.0054 
Drafters  0.0133 
Statistical assistants  -0.0181 
Demonstrators and product promoters  -0.2371 
Financial Clerks  -0.0182 
Parts salespersons  -0.0196 
Information and Record Clerks  -0.1501 
Other Office and Administrative Support Workers  -0.0911 
Order, receptionist and information clerks  0.0498 
Switchboard operators, including answering service  -0.1544 
Material Recording, Scheduling, Dispatching, and Distributing Workers  -0.0002 
Retail salespersons  -0.0249 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants  0.1310 
Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping  0.6125 
Telemarketers  -0.0009 
Cashiers, except gaming  -0.0173 
Note: Reported figures are averages over the entire sample. ϰn,SOSS measures the percentage employment change in occupation n  after an 1% 
percentage change in service offshoring. This elasticity is computed as ϰn,SOSS =ξn,SOSS+s
i
n⋅ρi,SOSS, where ξn,SOSS measures the percentage employment 
change in occupation n at given levels of employment in major group i; ρiSOSS  measures the percentage employment change in major group i; s
i
n is the 
share of occupation n in the wagebill of major group i. Estimates of ξn,SOSS and ρi,SOSS are reported in Table A3, whereas average values of s
i
n are 
reported in Table A5. Occupations in bold are defined as “tradeable” (see note to Table 4). Table A3 – Main components of the labor demand elasticities to Service Offshoring – Quasi-Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation 
Occupation  ξn,SOSS
§  Direct Effect of SOSS
§§  ρi,SOSS
§§§ 
  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.   
Management Occupations  0.0051 0.0016***  0.0059 
Chief executives  0.0000  0.0008       
Advert., MKTG, Prom., P.R. and Sales Man.  0.0017  0.0024       
Administrative services managers  0.0070  0.0003**       
Financial managers  0.0012  0.0012       
Human Resources Managers  0.0046  0.0021**       
Industrial production managers  -0.0019  0.0027       
Purchasing managers  0.0101  0.0003***       
Transp,, stor., and distrib. Man.  -0.0069  0.0098       
Construction managers  0.0049  0.0207       
Engineering managers  0.0191  0.0035***       
Medical and health services managers  -0.0649  0.0208***       
Prop., real est., and comm.. assoc. man.  -0.0003  0.0006       
Business and Financial Operations Occupations  -0.0200  0.0125*  -0.0268 
Buyers and Purchasing Agents  -0.0033  0.0017*       
Compliance officers  0.0559  0.0187***       
Cost estimators  -0.0112  0.0036***       
Human Res., Train. and Lab. Rel. Spec.  -0.0027  0.0025       
Management analysts  0.0749  0.0127***       
Accountants and auditors  -0.0088  0.0021***       
Budget analysts  0.0006  0.0002***       
Computer and Mathematical Occupations  -0.0500  0.0296*  -0.0410 
Computer programmers  -0.0099  0.0014***       
Computer support specialists  0.0057  0.0022***       
Computer systems analysts  0.0077  0.0017***       
Database administrators  -0.0038  0.0019**       
Architecture and Engineering Occupations  0.0047  0.0027*  0.0060 
Aerospace engineers  0.0112  0.0105       
Agricultural engineers  0.7575  0.8933       
Civil engineers  0.0149  0.0075**       
Computer hardware engineers  0.0587  0.0152***       
Industrial Engineers, Including Health and Safety  -0.0236  0.0051***       
Marine engineers and naval architects  0.2242  0.8334       
Materials engineers  -0.0120  0.0139       
Mechanical engineers  0.0086  0.0057       
Mining and geological engineers  0.0168  0.0258       
Petroleum engineers  -0.0922  0.2212       
Drafters 0.0128  0.0059**       
Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters  0.0040  0.0012***       
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations  -0.0040  0.0026*  -0.0058 
Life Scientists  0.0205  0.0261       
Physical Scientists  0.0080  0.0114       
Market and Survey Researchers  -0.0004  0.0021       
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians  -0.0128  0.0066*       
Legal Occupations    0.0734  0.0124***  0.0722 
Lawyers -  -       
Sales and Related Occupations  0.0013  0.0026  0.0018 
Cashiers, except gaming  -0.0173  0.0104*       
Parts salespersons  -0.0196  0.0531       
Retail salespersons  -0.0250  0.0089***       
Advertising sales agents  0.0696  0.0129***       
Sales Representatives  0.0016  0.0015       
Demonstrators and product promoters  -0.2371  0.0798***       
Sales engineers  0.0205  0.0062***       
Telemarketers -0.0009  0.0004**       
Office and Administrative Support Occupations  0.0030  0.0016*  0.0040 
First-line supervisors/managers   0.1319  0.0018***       
Switchboard operators, including answering service  -0.1544  0.0395***       
Financial Clerks  -0.0189  0.0021***       
Information and Record Clerks  -0.1501  0.0243***       
Order, receptionist and information clerks  0.0495  0.0024***       
Material Rec., Sched., Dispatc., and Distrib. Workers  -0.0015  0.0014       
Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping  0.6124  0.0058***       
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants  0.1304  0.0011***       
Other Office and Administrative Support Workers  -0.0917  0.0009***       
Statistical assistants  -0.0181  0.0001***       
Note: Standard Errors are computed through the delta method.
 *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. Reported 
figures are averages over the entire sample.  
§ See note to Table A2 
§§ Measures the percentage employment change in a major group after an 1% change in service offshoring, without accounting for 
the indirect effects passing through the wage indexes [see equation (3.11) in the text].  






 Table A4 – Manufacturing Industries Included in the Sample 
3-digit SIC Code  SIC Definition  3-digit SIC Code  SIC Definition 
201  Meat Products  245  Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes 
202  Dairy Products  249  Miscellaneous Wood Products 
203  Canned, Frozen, and Preserved Fruits, 
Vegetables, and Food Specialties  251 Household  Furniture 
204  Grain Mill Products  252  Office Furniture 
205 Bakery  Products  253 Public  Building and Related Furniture 
206  Sugar and Confectionery Products  254  Partitions, Shelving, Lockers, and Office  
207  Fats and Oils  259  Miscellaneous Furniture and Fixtures 
208 Beverages  261 Pulp  Mills 
209  Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred  262  Paper Mills 
211 Cigarettes  263 Paperboard  Mills 
212 Cigars  265 Paperboard  Containers and Boxes 
213  Chewing and Smoking Tobacco and Snuff  267  Converted Paper and Paperboard Products, Except 
Containers and Boxes 
214  Tobacco Stemming and Redrying  273  Books 
221 Broadwoven  Fabric Mills, Cotton  275  Commercial Printing 
222  Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Manmade Fiber and 
Silk  276  Manifold Business Forms 
223  Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Wool (including 
Dyeing and Finishing)  278  Blankbooks, Looseleaf Binders, and Bookbinding 
224  Narrow Fabric and Other Smallwares Mills 
Cotton, Wool, Silk, and Manmade Fiber  279  Service Industries For The Printing Trade 
225 Knitting  Mills  281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
226  Dyeing and Finishing Textiles, Except Wool 
Fabrics  282 
Plastics Materials and Synthetic Resins, Synthetic 
Rubber, Cellulosic and Other Manmade Fibers, Except 
Glass 
227  Carpets and Rugs  283  Drugs 
228  Yarn and Thread Mills  284  Soap, Detergents, and Cleaning Preparations; 
Perfumes, Cosmetics, and Other Toilet Preparations 
229  Miscellaneous Textile Goods  285  Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels, and Allied 
Products 
231  Men's and Boys' Suits, Coats, and Overcoats  286  Industrial Organic Chemicals 
232  Men's and Boys' Furnishings, Work Clothing, 
and Allied Garments  287 Agricultural  Chemicals 
233  Women's, Misses', and Juniors' Outerwear 289  Miscellaneous  Chemical  Products 
234  Women's, Misses', Children's, and Infants' 
Undergarments  291 Petroleum  Refining 
235  Hats, Caps, and Millinery  295  Asphalt Paving and Roofing Materials 
236  Girls', Children's, and Infants' Outerwear  299  Miscellaneous Products Of Petroleum and Coal 
237  Fur Goods  301  Tires and Inner Tubes 
238  Miscellaneous Apparel and Accessories  302  Rubber and Plastics Footwear 
239  Miscellaneous Fabricated Textile Products  305  Gaskets, Packing, and Sealing Devices and Rubber 
242  Sawmills and Planing Mills, General  306  Fabricated Rubber Products, Not Elsewhere 
243  Millwork, Veneer, Plywood, and Structural 
Wood  308  Miscellaneous Plastics Products 
























Table A4 – Manufacturing Industries Used in the Analysis (cont.) 
3-digit SIC Code  SIC Definition  3-digit SIC Code  SIC Definition 
313  Boot and Shoe Cut Stock and Findings  354  Metalworking Machinery and Equipment 
314  Footwear, Except Rubber  355  Special Industry Machinery, Except Metalworking 
315  Leather Gloves and Mittens  356  General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
316  Luggage  357  Computer and Office Equipment 
317  Handbags and Other Personal Leather Goods  358  Refrigeration and Service Industry Machinery 
319  Leather Goods, Not Elsewhere Classified  359  Miscellaneous Industrial and Commercial Machinery 
and Equipment 
321  Flat Glass  361  Electric Transmission and Distribution Equipment 
322  Glass and Glassware, Pressed Or Blown  362  Electrical Industrial Apparatus 
323  Glass Products, Made Of Purchased Glass  363  Household Appliances 
324  Cement, Hydraulic  364  Electric Lighting and Wiring Equipment 
325  Structural Clay Products  365  Household Audio and Video Equipment, and Audio 
Recordings 
326  Pottery and Related Products 366  Communications  Equipment 
327  Concrete, Gypsum, and Plaster Products  367  Electronic Components and Accessories 
328  Cut Stone and Stone Products  369  Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and 
Supplies 
329  Abrasive, Asbestos, and Miscellaneous  371  Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment 
331  Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, and Rolling And  372  Aircraft and Parts 
332  Iron and Steel Foundries  373  Ship and Boat Building and Repairing 
333  Primary Smelting and Refining Of Nonferrous 
Metals  374 Railroad  Equipment 
334  Secondary Smelting and Refining Of Nonferrous 
Metals  375  Motorcycles, Bicycles, and Parts 
335  Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding Of Nonferrous 
Metals  376  Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles and Parts 
336  Nonferrous Foundries (Castings)  379  Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment 
339  Miscellaneous Primary Metal Products  381 
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, 
Aeronautical, and Nautical Systems, Instruments, and 
Equipment 
341  Metal Cans and Shipping Containers  382  Laboratory Apparatus and Analytical, Optical, 
Measuring, and Controlling Instruments 
342  Cutlery, Handtools, and General Hardware  384  Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments and 
Supplies 
343  Heating Equipment, Except Electric and Warm 
Air; and Plumbing Fixtures  385 Ophthalmic  Goods 
344  Fabricated Structural Metal Products  386  Photographic Equipment and Supplies 
345  Screw Machine Products, and Bolts, Nuts, 
Screws, Rivets, and Washers  387  Watches, Clocks, Clockwork Operated Devices, and 
Parts 
346  Metal Forgings and Stampings  391  Jewelry, Silverware, and Plated Ware 
347 Coating,  Engraving, and Allied Services  393  Musical Instruments 
348  Ordnance and Accessories, Except Vehicles and 
Guided Missiles  394  Dolls, Toys, Games and Sporting and Athletic 
349  Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Products  395  Pens, Pencils, and Other Artists' Materials 
351  Engines and Turbines  396  Costume Jewelry, Costume Novelties, Buttons, and 
Miscellaneous Notions, Ecept Precious Metal 
352  Farm and Garden Machinery and Equipment  399  Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 






















Table A5 - Descriptive Statistics
* 




    Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. % zero obs.
White Collar           
Management Occupations  55.8  502  3.88  2.62  2.0 
Chief executives  55.2  831  47.29  15.34  0.2 
Advertising, Marketing, Promotions, Public Relations and Sales Managers 67.1  831  10.65  5.95  7.3 
Administrative services managers  41.0  831  2.38  1.84  16.1 
Financial managers  66.0  831  7.75  3.39  5.9 
Human Resources Managers  54.1  831  3.78  2.19  10.0 
Industrial production managers  91.4  831  16.24  7.25  4.6 
Purchasing managers  73.6  831  2.68  1.63  12.4 
Transportation, storage, and distribution managers  41.5  831  1.08  1.78  46.6 
Construction managers  8.8  831  0.19  1.26  85.7 
Engineering managers  73.7  831  7.66  7.79  15.4 
Medical and health services managers  6.8  831  0.10  1.14  94.0 
Property, real estate, and community association managers  82.5  831  0.20  2.33  95.0 
Business and Financial Operations Occupations  54.6  502  0.74  0.83  3.2 
Buyers and Purchasing Agents  72.5  783  31.35  14.56  3.7 
Compliance officers, except agriculture, construction, health and safety, and transportation 21.8  783  1.07  3.07  72.5 
Cost estimators  33.9  783  9.40  12.70  28.6 
Human Resources, Training and Labor Relations Specialists  38.9  783  12.12  9.63  20.2 
Management analysts  59.8  783  2.91  8.22  69.7 
Accountants and auditors  63.9  783  41.84  17.83  1.0 
Budget analysts  32.0  783  1.31  2.71  64.9 
Computer and Mathematical Occupations  59.3  502  0.64  3.05  10.6 
Computer programmers  66.3  717  37.27  21.72  6.6 
Computer support specialists  55.8  717  24.46  14.45  9.2 
Computer systems analysts  56.6  717  31.47  21.89  17.9 
Database administrators  56.8  717  6.80  6.88  33.5 
Architecture and Engineering Occupations 76.8  502  1.14  1.66  6.8 
Aerospace engineers 74.8  730  1.10  7.04  89.6 
Agricultural engineers  47.2  730  0.20  1.42  95.2 
Civil engineers  53.6  730  1.36  5.37  77.0 
Computer hardware engineers  72.4  730  3.28  11.12  67.4 
Industrial Engineers, Including Health and Safety  78.6  730  34.38  25.23  5.8 
Marine engineers and naval architects  53.5  730  0.17  2.39  97.3 
Materials engineers  86.3  730  4.05  8.70  51.5 
Mechanical engineers  82.6  730  23.05  17.20  14.8 
Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers  41.6  730  0.14  1.18  95.9 
Petroleum engineers  12.7  730  0.33  2.74  95.6 
Drafters  81.3 730  8.23  12.64  35.2 
Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters  87.3  730  23.71  17.25  12.3 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations  14.9  502  0.27  0.69  21.9 
Life Scientists  28.6  563  6.84  18.57  76.2 
Physical Scientists  37.6  563  27.02  24.73  30.6 
Market and Survey Researchers  10.2  563  45.95  32.06  57.2 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians  9.9  563  20.19  33.65  15.5 
Legal Occupations  75.8  502  0.31  3.25  73.5 
Lawyers          
Sales and Related Occupations  85.8  502  1.21  2.36  4.4 
Cashiers, except gaming  82.5  772  1.51  7.67  79.9 
Parts salespersons  93.1  772  0.19  1.05  90.8 
Retail salespersons  95.9  772  5.47  10.05  45.6 
Advertising sales agents  35.2  772  0.92  3.84  88.2 
* Wage bill or cost shares (in %) for all variables excluding the explanatory ones. 
§ Share of national employment accounted for by the industries included in the sample. 
 
 Table A5 - Descriptive Statistics
* (cont.) 




    Obs. Mean  Std. Dev.  % zero obs. 
White Collar           
Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing  86.6  772  82.98  17.86  0.1 
Demonstrators and product promoters  62.6  772  0.43  1.47  78.9 
Sales engineers  80.0  772  7.44  11.15  45.1 
Telemarketers 35.1  772  1.06  5.01  82.4 
Office and Administrative Support Occupations  54.8  502  2.49  2.12  2.2 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support workers 49.9  778  9.82  4.29  4.5 
Switchboard operators, including answering service  32.1  778  0.75  0.80  24.7 
Financial Clerks  50.5  778  17.71  5.93  1.3 
Information and Record Clerks  47.1  778  0.65  1.40  35.2 
Order, receptionist and information clerks  40.6  778  6.17  3.51  6.4 
Material Recording, Scheduling, Dispatching, and Distributing Workers  75.2  778  34.36  11.37  0.1 
Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping  57.1  778  1.63  2.14  29.1 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants  86.7  778  14.25  7.23  2.8 
Other Office and Administrative Support Workers  40.0  778  14.57  6.75  1.8 
Statistical assistants  43.8  778  0.09  0.45  81.0 
Blue Collar (Major Groups Only)           
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations  14.4  502  0.13  0.17  5.0 
Construction and Extraction Occupations 42.7  502  0.72  3.53  12.6 
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations  33.8  502  0.57  0.54  7.0 
Production Occupations  82.3  502  8.96  6.88  2.6 
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations  46.9  502  1.77  1.77  2.8 
Other Inputs           
Energy -  502  2.49  3.34  0.0 
Non Energy Material  -  502  74.67  12.82  0.0 
Explanatory Variables           
Service Offshoring  -  836  3.75  8.00  - 
Material Offshoring  -  833  16.27  11.05  - 
Share of High-Tech Capital  -  859  6.16  6.69  - 
lnK -  859  8.60  1.83  - 
lnY -  864  9.69  1.68  - 
* Wage bill or cost shares (in %) for all variables excluding the explanatory ones. 
§ Share of national employment accounted for by the industries included in the sample. 
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